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Abstract
This paper quantitatively assesses the relative importance of demand and
supply-side factors in the recent slowdown of US growth. For this purpose,
we estimate a DSGE model with heterogeneous firms and endogenous Schum-
peterian growth. We find that Keynesian fluctuations in risk premia and sav-
ings behavior drive the recession. However, our results challenge the view
that the slump is a pure demand-side phenomenon. Adverse supply-side fac-
tors such as reduced technological spillovers from frontier innovations have
also shaped growth dynamics and emerged well before the financial turmoil.
JEL classification: E3 · O3 · O4
Keywords: Endogenous growth · R&D · Schumpeterian Growth · Bayesian Estima-
tion
∗Corresponding author: Guido Cozzi: guido.cozzi@unisg.ch, Institute of Economics (FGN-
HSG), University of St.Gallen, Varnbuelstrasse 19, CH-9000 St.Gallen. Pataracchia: European
Commission, JRC, beatrice.pataracchia@ec.europa.eu, Pfeiffer: TU Berlin & European Commis-
sion, DG ECFIN, E-mail: philipplepfeiffer@gmail.com, Ratto: European Commission, JRC, E-mail:
marco.ratto@ec.europa.eu. We thank Michael Burda, Diego Comin, Frank Heinemann, Marco del
Negro, and Janos Varga for very useful suggestions, and seminar participants in Canterbury, Ed-
inburgh (SED), Cologne (EEA), Ispra, Milan (CEF), St. Gallen, Tilburg, and Villa del Grumello,
Como for useful comments. The research leading to these results has received funding from the
European Community’s Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013) under grant agreement
no. 612796. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and should not be attributed
to the European Commission.
1
1 Introduction
Following the Great Recession of 2008-2009, medium-term growth prospects in
the US and many developed countries have deteriorated substantially. The crisis
seems to have generated a persistent downward shift in the GDP trend displayed
in Figure 1.
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Figure 1: Real GDP and R&D Investment
Notes: Left panel: The blue continuous line depicts real GDP in Billions of Chained 2010 dollars in
the US. Shaded areas denote NBER recessions. The dashed red line (dashed-dotted black line) fits
a linear trend from 1995Q1 until 2007Q3 (from 2009Q3 until 2015Q1). Right panel: The blue con-
tinuous line depicts real R&D investment in Billions of Chained 2010 Dollars (excluding software
expenses). Shaded areas denote NBER recessions. Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis (NIPA
tables).
Since this has happened after the 2008 financial crisis, it suggests that the sud-
den unavailability of credit to investment resulting from the crisis has led to a
GDP decline below its long-term trend. Can a temporary financial shock generate
such a persistent effect? The financial collapse reduced physical capital accumu-
lation during the crisis and the resulting credit crunch. However, since standard
macroeconomics assumes decreasing returns to physical capital, GDP should go
back to trend after the financial trouble has ended. Alternatively, we could think
of an adverse exogenous technology shock, perhaps co-occurring with the finan-
cial crisis, or even causing it. Yet, the above evidence would suggest a very high
persistence of such an exogenous technological shock.
Our paper emphasizes that technology does not evolve exogenously. Instead,
an essential driver of technology is research and development (R&D) activity. En-
dogenous technological growth opens the possibility that slowing innovation is
the result of insufficient demand. In fact, measured R&D investment features a sig-
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nificant temporary negative deviation of its trend during the financial crisis (right
panel of Figure 1). If TFP growth results from R&D-driven innovations, then the
contraction in R&D at least partially explains the protracted productivity and GDP
growth slowdown. However, Cette et al. (2016) suggest that adverse innovation
dynamics have started well before the crisis and that the TFP slowdown preceded
the Great Recession. This observation also squares with the hypothesis of Gordon
(2017) that advances in information and communications technology (ICT) have
exhausted a large part of their growth potential and were already widely adopted
in the early 2000s. More generally, while innovation-related channels may be cen-
tral, Keynesian channels such as insufficient private and government demand or
ineffective monetary policy close to the zero lower bound (ZLB) are important as
well.
The precise question is: How much of the observed growth slowdown is due
to supply-side factors such as a pre-crisis decline of the innovative capacity and
how much is it due to Keynesian demand-side factors? Importantly, endogenous
growth links supply and demand: The demand slump can reduce R&D activities
and technology adoption, leading to protracted low TFP growth.
If these factors are jointly at work, they cannot be studied in isolation. There-
fore, a complete macroeconomic explanation of what has happened should in-
volve innovation, growth, and business cycle analysis. To this aim, we construct an
integrated growth and business cycle model. The framework incorporates Schum-
peterian creative destruction, based on Aghion and Howitt (1992) and Nuño (2011),
into a medium-scale New Keynesian model, based on Smets and Wouters (2003)
and Kollmann et al. (2016). We estimate the model using US data from 1984Q1
to 2017Q2. This period covers many important events involving innovation and
growth - the burst of the dot-com bubble, the 2009 collapse in R&D - and busi-
ness cycle and monetary policy events - financial crisis build-up and explosion,
unprecedented fiscal stimulus, ZLB hit by the Fed interest rate.
Despite the importance of such an analysis, there are only a few estimated
models that integrate business cycle and medium-run growth. Bianchi et al. (2019)
estimate a model with R&D capital exerting a positive spillover on the economy
like in Frankel (1962) and Romer (1986). Anzoategui et al. (2019) adapt the knowl-
edge diffusion model of Comin and Gertler (2006) to show how demand-driven
slumps lead to business cycle persistence via endogenous R&D activity. Varga
et al. (2016) extend this framework to a semi-endogenous growth model calibrated
to US and EA data. Guerron-Quintana and Jinnai (2019) highlight the role of micro
founded financial frictions. Despite their insightful contributions to an emerging
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integrated macroeconomics1 literature, none of these papers considers creative de-
struction, which is consistent with the micro evidence that innovation and growth
correlate positively with firm entry and firm exit.2 Variety expansion models pre-
dict firm exit to harm growth. By contrast, Schumpeterian models argue that real-
location from less productive exiting firms to more productive firms is an engine
of productivity growth in line with industry evidence (Kogan et al. 2017).3
In our model, growth is endogenously driven by Schumpeterian R&D activ-
ities and knowledge accumulation. As in Aghion and Howitt (1992) and Nuño
(2011), innovations are the outcome of a sectoral patent-race. Each innovation is
a new intermediate good of enhanced quality. Entrepreneurs collect funds from
households to invest in R&D aimed at capturing monopoly rents. In each pe-
riod, there is a probability that the firm jumps to the technological frontier. If the
innovation occurs, the entrepreneur earns monopoly profits until a new innova-
tor replaces the firm. Growth of the technological frontier results from positive
knowledge spillovers of R&D activities. These spillovers are subject to shocks that
alter the basic research content of R&D. The model assumes a semi-endogenous
growth structure in the innovative frontier evolution, while its adoption follows
a purely endogenous growth mechanism. Unlike existing stylized Schumpeterian
growth models, the DSGE structure allows an estimation of the main innovation
and growth parameters.
On the Keynesian side, we incorporate monopolistic competition in product
and labor markets, as well as price and wage stickiness. Only a few papers have
considered creative destruction with price stickiness (see, in particular, Benigno
and Fornaro (2017), Oikawa and Ueda (2015, 2018, 2019), Pinchetti (2020) and
Rozsypal (2016)). The model also includes a potentially important role of stabi-
lization policies: A rich fiscal policy block includes government debt accumula-
tion and estimated fiscal rules governing distortionary taxation on labor, capital
income, and consumption. The central bank follows an estimated Taylor rule sub-
ject to a ZLB constraint.4
We then proceed to take the model to the data. Generally speaking, our analy-
1Integrating growth and business cycle in a unified way.
2See for example Foster et al. (2001) influential evidence that the ongoing replacement of less
productive with more productive plants is a central driver of industry multifactor productivity
3For the importance of reallocation as an engine of growth, see also Acemoglu et al. (2018).
4We include other standard aspects commonly used in estimated DSGE models such as habit
formation, real wage rigidities, and flow adjustment costs in investment. Time-varying capacity
utilization captures the cyclical use of the capital stock. Moreover, a previous version of our paper
(Cozzi et al. 2017) presented an even richer model environment, including liquidity-constrained
households, labor habits, as well as partially backward-looking price and wage setting. These
features slightly improved the model fit but do not affect any of the main results.
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Figure 2: Model overview
Notes: This figure provides a graphical overview of the main flows in the model (omitting, for
example, compensation flows).
sis builds on interactions between innovation dynamics and macroeconomic con-
ditions. We therefore include R&D data as an observable among the main macro
data series. A Bayesian estimation quantifies the relative contribution of the vari-
ous shocks in explaining the low growth environment since the financial crisis of
2008-09. Nonlinear methods account for the occasionally binding ZLB. The esti-
mation suggests that fluctuations in investment risk premia are a crucial driver of
the Great Recession, alongside the consumer saving shock. Their interaction char-
acterizes the joint decline in physical capital, R&D investment, and consumption.
Despite the importance of the 2008 financial crisis, pre-crisis factors play a cen-
tral role in explaining the persistent downturn. The estimated model identifies a
downward turning point of frontier technology dynamics following the dot-com
bubble burst in 2001. The slowdown of innovation dynamics led to gradual ex-
haustion of unadopted technologies. According to the model estimation, these
adverse dynamics and reduced knowledge spillovers are partially responsible for
the sclerotic growth following the financial crisis.
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2 Model
This section lays out the economic environment. Figure 2 provides a graphical
overview of our unified growth and business cycle framework. The endogenous
growth part is based on Schumpeterian theory. R&D Entrepreneurs collect funds
from household-owned investment funds. They invest into R&D to increase their
probabilities of innovation. If the innovation occurs, the firm jumps to the frontier
and earns monopoly rents. Positive knowledge spillovers of R&D push the aggre-
gate frontier further. The Keynesian channels owing to price and wage rigidities
highlight the role of monetary and fiscal stabilization policy and stochastic house-
hold demand.
2.1 Households and unions
There is a continuum of households indexed by j ∈ [0, 1]. Households work,
consume, receive nominal transfers TRj,t from the government and hold assets.
Their risky portfolio consists of government bonds (BBj,t) and firm shares (Sj,t) with
nominal returns (1 + iBt ) and (1 + i
S
t+1), respectively.
5 The return on shares is
derived below in equation (17). Households have access risk-free bonds B
r f
j,t with
return (1 + it).6 PSt denotes the share price.
The real per-period budget constraint is
(
1 − τN
) Wt
Pt
Nj,t + (1 + i
B
t−1)
BBj,t−1
Pt
+ (1 + it−1)
B
r f
j,t−1
Pt
+ (1 + iSt )
Sj,t−1P
S
t−1
Pt
+
TRj,t
Pt
+ Πt = (1 + τ
C)Cj,t +
BBj,t
Pt
+
B
r f
j,t
Pt
+
PSt
Pt
Sj,t + exp(ε
T
t )
Tj,t
Pt
+ ΓWt /Pt,
(1)
where Pt denotes the GDP deflator. τ
C and τN are tax rates levied on consumption
Cj,t and wages Wt, respectively. Lump-sum taxes Tj,t are subject to a tax shock ε
T
t .
Γwt are nominal wage adjustment costs. Nj,t and Πt denote hours worked and real
profits of all firms other than intermediate goods producers, respectively.
5Bond returns are pre-determined whereas the stock market return is uncertain indicated by
the timing t + 1.
6Note that we distinguish government bonds BBt and risk-free bonds B
r f
j,t . The former feature a
stochastic risk premium (see below) and are used to finance government deficits. We will use data
on government interest payments to estimate the shock. By contrast, risk-free assets are in the zero
net supply and do not feature a stochastic preference.
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Households maximize their lifetime utility
E0
∞
∑
t=0
βtΘt
{
(Cj,t − hCt−1)
1−θ
1 − θ
− ωNt
(
Nj,t
)1+θN
1 + θN
− U Bj,t × λ̄t/Pt
}
, (2)
where 0 < θ, θN. h governs external consumption habits. β is the discount factor.
Θt ≡ exp
(
∑
t−1
τ=0 ε
C
τ
)
is a (cumulative) saving shock.7 ωNt is a labor disutility term.
8
PC,vatt denotes the prices including taxes, i.e. P
C,vat
t = (1 + τ
C)Pt.
U Bj,t/Pt introduces preferences for (real) financial assets into the utility function.
This approach is in the spirit of Sidrauski (1967) and follows Krishnamurthy and
Vissing-Jorgensen (2012). Integrating stochastic preferences for financial assets
allows to mimic dynamics of financial shocks without formally incorporating a
financial sector.9 Our results show these shocks drive a large share of cyclical
variation in output growth, in particular during the financial crisis 2008-09. U Bj,t is
scaled by an exogenous marginal utility term λ̄t to ensure a balance growth path.
It is defined as
U Bj,t =
(
αB + εBt
)
BBj,t +
(
αS + εSt
)
PSt Sj,t. (3)
Given this specification, the asset-specific risk premium depends on two elements.
Estimated exogenous autocorrelated shocks εQt−1 with Q ∈ {B, S} capture cyclical
variation in preferences for financial assets. The intercept terms αS and αB imply a
positive equity premium and a treasury bill convenience yield in the steady state,
respectively.10 For example, in the linearized model, returns on shares are a func-
tion of the risk-free rate and a risk premium (featuring a constant and a stochastic
component):
iSt+1 = it + α
S + εSt
︸ ︷︷ ︸
risk premium
. (4)
Appendix A.1 presents the household optimality conditions.
7The term Θt implies that the households’ intertemporal optimality conditions equations fea-
ture a time t shock εCt , i.e. the discount factor β is replaced by β exp(ε
C
t ). See Appendix A.1.
8As we discuss below, we estimate the model while preserving trends in the data. To ensure a
balance growth path with separable utility, labor disutility includes an exogenous multiplicative
term featuring aggregate consumption, C1−θt , such that ω
N
t = ω
NC1−θt . Note that ω
N
t only depends
on aggregate consumption, i.e. it is not internalized by households.
9See, e.g. Christiano et al. (2015), Del Negro et al. (2016), Vitek (2017), and Gust et al. (2017).
10Fisher (2015) uses a simpler formulation. He gives a “flight-to-quality” interpretation, mi-
cro founded as a preference for risk-free bonds. We generalize this idea by calibrating different
marginal utilities for different assets.
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Household j sells its labor service to a monopolistically competitive trade union
which sets wages at a markup (µw) over the marginal rate of substitution between
working and consuming (mrst):
(
1 − τN
) Wt
Pt
+ Γwt (·) + u
U
t
Wt
Pt
=
(
µwmrst
)1−γwr(
(1 − τN)
Wt−1
Pt−1
)γwr
, (5)
where ΓWt summarizes nominal wage adjustment costs parametrized by γ
W . Real
wages adjust sluggishly as in Blanchard and Galí (2007) governed by parameter
γwr. uUt is a labor supply shock. See Appendix A.2 for further details.
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2.2 Goods production
A representative perfectly competitive final good producer bundles intermediate
goods, indexed i ∈ [0, 1], using a constant-returns technology
Yt =
[ ∫ 1
0
Y
σy−1
σy
i,t di
] σ
y
σy−1
, (6)
where σy > 1 denotes the elasticity of substitution. Demand for intermediate
goods follows from profit maximization:
Yt(i) =
(
Pt(i)
Pt
)−σy
Yt. (7)
Each differentiated intermediate good is produced by a monopolist using to-
tal capital Ktoti,t−1 and labor Ni,t. Total capital is the sum of perfectly substitutable
private and public capital (see below). The production function is Cobb-Douglas:
Yi,t = Ai,t (Ni,t)
a
(
cui,t
Ktoti,t−1
At
)1−a
, (8)
where a denotes the labor share, Ai,t is the endogenous sector-specific productivity
level and cui,t is firm-specific level of capital utilization. With more sophisticated
technologies, production becomes more capital-intensive. At =
∫ 1
0 Ai,td i is the av-
erage productivity across all sectors in the differentiated goods production. Total
Factor Productivity is TFPt = (At)
a .
As a consequence of (8), sectors with higher relative technological sophistica-
11The Online Appendix provides a full derivation.
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tion benefit more from the average technological level across sectors:12
Yi,t =
(
Ai,t
At
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
rel. technology level
(AtNi,t)
a (cui,tK
tot
i,t−1
)1−a
. (9)
Intermediate good firms choose prices, employment, and capacity utilization
to maximize dividends subject to the production technology (9) and the demand
from final goods producers (7). Dividends are given by
di,t =
(
1 − τK
)(Pi,t
Pt
Yi,t −
Wt
Pt
Ni,t
)
− adji,t, (10)
where τK is a corporate income tax. adji,t denotes total adjustment costs associated
with quadratic price and factor adjustments.13 We assume that a fully mutualized
investment fund invests on behalf of firms. Capital accumulation follows Ki,t =
(1 − δ)Ki,t−1 + Ii,t, where δ is the capital depreciation rate, and Ii,t denotes gross
investment in physical capital. Public capital K
g
i,t follows an analogous law of
motion. The Phillips curve linking output growth and inflation is standard:
µt =(1 − τ
K)
(σy − 1)
σy
+ γP
Pt
Pt−1
(
πt − π̄
)
− γP
[
Λt,t+1
Pt+1
Pt
Yt+1
Yt
(
πt+1 − π̄
)
]
+ εMUYt , (11)
where µt denotes the multiplier associated with the production function (9) and
πt ≡ Pt/Pt−1. π̄ is steady state inflation. γ
P governs quadratic price adjustment
costs. Λt,t+1 is the stochastic (stock market) discount factor of households, derived
in equation (A.5).
Price-setting and labor demand are subject to stochastic disturbances, εMUYt
and εNDt , respectively. Since the optimality conditions are standard, we relegate
the details to Appendix A.3.
2.3 Endogenous innovation
Next, we describe the endogenous technological progress feature of our model.
12This formulation allows us to avoid keeping track of a distribution of firms and instead only
look at average firms and frontier firms.
13The functional forms are standard and reported in Appendix A.3.
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Innovations. Innovations generate growth. In each period t, the productivity of
a sector Ai,t jumps to the technology frontier A
max
t with probability ni,t−1. The
frontier is publicly available. It represents the most advanced technological level
across all sectors defined as Amaxt ≡ max{Ai,t|i ∈ [0, 1]}. Productivity in each
sector i evolves as:
Ai,t =
{
Amaxt , with probability ni,t−1
Ai,t−1, with probability 1 − ni,t−1
}
. (12)
Entrepreneurs. Innovations are the result of entrepreneurial investments into
R&D. The probability of reaching the frontier is itself endogenous. In each sector
i and in each period t, an entrepreneur is randomly selected with the opportunity
to try to innovate.14 If such entrepreneur’s R&D firm invests R&D cost XRDi,t , it
will produce a probability ni,t of a successful innovation, which entails the dis-
covery of a new intermediate good with next period’s frontier productivity Amaxt+1 .
We assume that research is more difficult if the overall technology frontier is more
advanced, i.e. per unit research costs increase with the frontier productivity Amaxt .
The probability of innovation is independent across sectors. In each sector i, it
follows production function:
ni,t =



(
XRDi,t
λRD Amaxi,t
) 1
(η+1)
, if XRDi,t < λ
RD Amaxt+1
1, if XRDi,t ≥ λ
RD Amaxt



, (13)
where λRD > 0 is an R&D difficulty parameter and η > 0 accounts for decreas-
ing returns of R&D. An innovation occurring at time t will permit production in
period t + 1. Moreover, the second line of equation (13) guarantees that the prob-
ability of innovation per period is no larger than 1.15
The new good is by definition of the highest quality. By Bertrand competi-
tion and following a price war, the new patent holder will replace the existing
incumbent monopolist and appropriate all profits in t + 1. Hence, the prospects
of becoming the next period’s incumbent create the incentives to invest in R&D at
time t. Since the new entrant does not internalize the loss incurred by the previ-
ous incumbent, creative destruction can imply both, too much or too little R&D
investment.16
14Hence, innovative ideas are scarce as they “arrive to random agents at random times” (Erkal
and Scotchmer, 2011, p.1).
15In a continuous time framework, this could be any non-negative number. In our simulations
nt always remains strictly below one.
16A horizontal innovation framework, by missing this business-stealing externality, implies too
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Similar to capital investment, we assume adjustment costs in R&D investment.
The R&D adjustment cost function follows
adjRDi,t (X
RD
i,t ) ≡
γRD
2Yt
(XRDi,t − X
RD
t−1gY)
2, (14)
where gY denotes output trend which makes adjustment costs stationary.
17
Innovation at time t is like a static lottery. Given individual risk aversion, we
assume that the R&D firm in each sector finances risky innovations via a mu-
tual fund. Households pool resources to completely diversify innovation risk
across the continuum of sectors (by the law of large numbers). The fund requires
a stochastic R&D-specific investment risk premium, εAYt , which helps fit the ob-
served R&D series. The R&D entrepreneurial problem is then a simple expected
profit maximization:
max
XRDi,t
= ni,t
[
PSmaxi,t
Pt
]
−
[
XRDi,t + adj
RD
i,t (X
RD
i,t )
] (
1 + εAYt
)
, (15)
where PSmaxt is the nominal stock market value of the firm at the technological
frontier.
The value of becoming the incumbent is the same across sectors. Thus, in equi-
librium the R&D investment cost is symmetric, XRDi,t = X
RD
t , as is the probability
of success ni,t = nt. The R&D optimality condition, after making use of equation
(13), then becomes:
nt
(η + 1)
[
PSmaxt
Pt
]
= XRDt
(
γRD
Yt
(XRDt − X
RD
t−1gY)
)
(1 + εAYt ). (16)
Note that R&D firms earn positive profits as long as η > 0.18 By the law of large
numbers, nt also measures the fraction of sectors which innovate each period, as
well as the fraction of firms that exit and enter the market. The higher the equilib-
rium value of nt, the stronger innovation and creative destruction, and the more
dynamic the set of innovative industries.
little R&D in equilibrium.
17The interpretation of adjustment costs in a creative destruction environment requires expla-
nation: we are implicitly assuming that if a new entrant undertakes R&D, the previous period
R&D laboratory size (magnified by trend GDP growth) sets the benchmark for the current R&D
investment size, penalizing departures from it.
18The case η = 0 nests a linear R&D technology and also a free-entry case (as long as the equi-
librium innovation probability is less than 1). In this last case ideas are not scarce.
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Stock Market Value. Households own intermediate good produces with total
value PSt St. We normalize the total number of stocks to 1. Firms are heterogeneous
and firm turnover follows innovation. Due to Schumpeterian creative destruction,
a fraction nt−1 of obsolete firms belonging to time t − 1 portfolio is lost at time
t, replaced by new entrants with higher stock market value PSmaxt . Taking firm
exit into account, the gross nominal return on the aggregate time t stock market
portfolio is given by:
1 + iSt ≡
dtPt + PSt − nt−1P
Smax
t
PSt−1
. (17)
The return depends on the value of the average dividend payments dt. It also takes
into account capital gains and losses. The average time t portfolio, PSt , includes
the innovative firms that have replaced fraction nt−1 of time t industry. Hence, we
subtract their aggregate value, nt−1P
Smax
t , in equation (17).
Frontier Value. The frontier technology net growth rate gAmaxt is defined as
gAmaxt =
Amaxt − A
max
t−1
Amaxt−1
. (18)
Entrepreneurs collect funds from households. They invest into R&D to reach the
technological frontier, patent its adaptation to their sector, and appropriate the re-
sulting production monopoly. Hence, each entrepreneur at the frontier earns the
monopoly profits resulting from offering the highest quality intermediate good.
These profits (and the resulting dividends) are (Amaxt )/(At) times bigger than
those of the average technology firm. Therefore, the stock market value as of time
t, PSmaxt , of a firm that will start producing at the technology
PSmaxt
Pt
= Et
[
Λt,t+1
(
dt+1
(
Amaxt+1
At+1
)
+
PSmaxt+1
Pt+1gAmaxt+1
(1 − nt+1)
)]
. (19)
Notice that patents of the latest and most advanced technology require one period
of implementation. Therefore, for an innovation developed in period t, production
and dividend flows only start in t + 1. Furthermore, the continuation value in
the stock market in t + 1 takes into account that competitors may successfully
innovate. With probability nt+1 a new entrant will replace the monopolist in t + 2.
With probability 1− nt+1 no innovation is found in the sector in t + 1. In this case,
the firm’s value (along with its dividends) remains positive but lower than that of
a generic newly entered innovator by a factor equal to gAmaxt+1 . This explains the last
12
part of the numerator of equation (19).
Frontier and diffusion. The growth of the technological frontier, gAmaxt , is the
outcome of positive knowledge spillovers from the aggregate innovation efforts
as in Howitt and Aghion (1998). According to this Schumpeterian view, R&D ac-
tivities have an appropriable applied content, i.e. the patentable sectoral adoption
of the technological frontier and a basic aspect that firms cannot appropriate. The
latter pushes the aggregate technological frontier further: Basic content of aggre-
gate R&D freely spills over to all sectors.
Following Nuño (2011), R&D spillover is time-varying and stochastic. This
captures the potentially volatile basic research content of R&D. In reduced form,
this reflects, for example, the research orientation of scientists and engineers, uni-
versity policies, or regulatory aspects of intellectual property rights (IPRs). For-
mally, we assume that
Amaxt = A
max
t−1 +
(
Amaxt−1
)ϕ
(
XRDt−1
Yt−1
Nt−1
)λA
σRDt , (20)
where ϕ < 1 reflects decreasing returns to the intertemporal knowledge spillover
as in Jones (1995) and in Bloom et al. (2020). λA is an externality parameter. It
captures, for example, research duplication or knowledge theft but also positive
externalities from research efforts (Jones and Williams, 2000).
The instantaneous knowledge spillover follows an exogenous process given by
σRDt = σ
RD exp(εσt ), (21)
where εσt is an R&D spillover shock and σ
RD denotes steady-state spillovers. Ac-
cording to equation (20), the technological frontier depends on its previous pe-
riod’s value, and on the fraction of the employees indirectly working in R&D
(given by
XRDt−1
Yt−1
Nt−1) in the past period. We can then express the growth rate of
the technological frontier as:
gAmaxt =
(
XRDt−1
Yt−1
Nt−1
)λA
σRDt
(
Amaxt−1
)1−ϕ
. (22)
On a balanced growth path, gAmaxt and
XRDt−1
Yt−1
are constant. Log-differencing (22)
13
implies
gAmaxt =
λAgPOP
1 − ϕ
. (23)
As in Jones (1995), the growth rate of population gPOP governs the long-run growth
rate of the frontier. The factor of proportionality depends on the extent of decreas-
ing returns, inversely represented by λA.19
Unlike in Nuño (2011), the evolution of the technological frontier in the model
is semi-endogenous, as in Jones (1995). Its adoption, however, remains fully en-
dogenous, as in Comin and Gertler (2006) and Anzoategui et al. (2019). This for-
mulation permits to eliminate the counterfactual strong scale effects that plagued
the early generation endogenous growth models. It also avoids steady-state growth
rate effects of R&D policy variables and shocks, which facilitates the comparison
with the standard exogenous growth DSGE models.
The average technological progress results from the adoption of the frontier
technology. Endogenous R&D activity determines the average intermediate goods
productivity in the economy:
At =
∫ 1
0
{
ni,t−1A
max
t + (1 − ni,t−1)Ai,t−1
}
d i
= nt−1
(
Amaxt − At−1
)
+ At−1, (24)
using ni,t−1 = nt−1. On a balanced growth path, the frontier A
max
t grows at the
same rate as the average technological level defined in equation (24).
2.4 Monetary and fiscal authorities
The monetary authority sets the notional nominal interest rate inott according to a
Taylor rule:
inott = ρ
i
(
it−1 − ī
)
+
(
1 − ρi
) (
ηi,π (πt − π̄) + η
i,yỹt
)
+ ī, (25)
where the steady-state nominal interest rate (ī) equals the sum of the steady-state
real interest rate and steady-state inflation, i.e. ī = r + π̄. ỹt is the output gap and
19Note that unlike in Jones (1995) and Varga et al. (2016) the growth of Amaxt does not refer to
the growth rate of patents but rather to the growth rate of a frontier productivity index. While
this is derived from the flow of new patents invented, its numerical value already accounts for the
effect of patents on productivity. Therefore, we should expect a lower value of λA than in Jones
and Williams (2000) and Varga et al. (2016).
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ηiπ > 1 and ηiy > 0. 20
Following the Great Recession, at least through late 2015, the ZLB on nominal
interest rates was effectively binding. It hampered the Fed’s ability to stimulate
the economy by further lowering the policy rate. Formally, we impose the ZLB
constraint on the net nominal interest rate by requiring the effective policy rate to
satisfy:
it = max{i
not
t , i
LB}+ uit, (26)
where uit is a white noise shock and i
LB parametrizes the ZLB.
Government consumption and physical capital investment follow estimated
rules:
cGt − c
G =ρG(cGt−1 − c
G) + uGt , (27)
iGt − i
G =ρIG(iGt−1 − i
G) + uIGt , (28)
where cGt ≡
Gt
Yt
and iGt ≡
IGt
Yt
are government consumption and investment as
shares of GDP, respectively.21 uGt and u
IG
t are white noise disturbances. Govern-
ment transfers react to deviations from deficit and debt targets, denoted d f and b,
respectively.
trt − tr = ρ
tr(trt−1 − tr) + η
d f
(
BBt − B
B
t−1
Yt
− d f
)
+ ηb
(
BBt
Yt
− b
)
+ utrt , (29)
where trt ≡
TRt
Yt
are net nominal transfers normalized by GDP. BBt denotes total
nominal government debt owned by households, ηd f is a deficit coefficient, ηb is
a debt coefficient. utrt is a white noise transfer shock. The government budget
constraint is BBt = (1 + i
B
t )B
B
t−1 − Revt + PtGt + Pt I
G
t + TRt, where Revt is the
nominal revenue of the government.
2.5 Market clearing
Labor markets clear. Financial market clearing requires St = 1 (normalization)
and Bt = BBt . Finally, the aggregate budget identity takes R&D investment into
account
Yt = Ct + It + Gt + I
G
t + adjt + X
RD
t . (30)
20The output gap is measured by ỹt = log (Yt)− yt where yt is (log) output trend.
21Lower case letters without time subscript denote steady-state values.
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2.6 Exogenous processes
All exogenous shock processes of a generic type x (unless specified explicitly)
follow autoregressive processes of order one with an autocorrelation coefficient
|ρx| < 1 and innovation uxt . Thus,
εxt = ρ
xεxt−1 + u
x
t . (31)
3 Results
3.1 Data and estimation approach
Data and non-stationarity. Our estimation approach does not require any trans-
formation of the data. We assume the data follow a stochastic trend, induced by
the effects of random shocks on endogenous productivity. Productivity also fea-
tures a constant (drift) term common to all variables. This econometric approach
preserves all relative trends in the data. It allows us to meaningfully decompose
the growth slowdown into technological (supply) and demand factors. In total,
we use data on 16 macroeconomic time series ranging from 1983Q1 until 2017Q2
taken from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) and the Federal Reserve.22
Appendix B provides additional details.
Nonlinearity. To account for the occasionally binding constraint on nominal in-
terest rates, we build on the piecewise linear OccBin algorithm (Guerrieri and Ia-
coviello 2015). This method handles the constraints as two regimes of the model
in which the ZLB constraint is either slack or binding. The dynamics within any
of the two regimes depend on the endogenous length of that regime. The ex-
pected duration, in turn, depends on the state variables and exogenous distur-
bances. As emphasized in Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2015), the interaction of the
expected regime length and state variables can result in highly nonlinear dynam-
ics. Following Giovannini et al. (2020), we integrate the nonlinear solution into
a specially adapted Kalman filter and estimate the model with the occasionally
binding ZLB. Appendix C provides additional details on the estimation and shock
decomposition procedure.
Calibration and estimation. Following the literature on estimated DSGE mod-
els, we set the values for a subset of parameters a priori by using the steady-state
22The relatively large number of observables is due to our detailed fiscal policy block. Results
are robust to the exclusion of details on fiscal policy.
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restrictions. We estimate the remaining parameters with Bayesian methods using
the piecewise linear model approximation using first a parallelized Slice sampler
(150 draws). We then run an additional Metropolis Hastings algorithm with length
200.000. The Online Appendix provides detailed convergence statistics.
The calibration and estimation procedures are interdependent. The estimated
parameters affect the calibrated parameters and vice versa. A notable example of
this interdependence is λA, the R&D externality parameter. Since,
TFPt = (At)
a , (32)
it follows that the steady-state TFP growth rate is gTFP = agA = agAmax . The
steady-state restriction imposed by equation (23) then determines λA as a function
of the estimated parameter ϕ̂ and the labor share a:
λA = (1 − ϕ̂)−1
gTFP
agPOP
. (33)
Model fit. Table 1 evaluates the capability of the model to fit the data. The first
columns compare sample and model-implied moments for real GDP, private con-
sumption, private (capital) investment, R& D investment, and employment. The
volatility of real variables slightly exceeds its empirical counterparts, particularly
for R& D investment. Nonetheless, the estimated model captures the volatility
of GDP and its components reasonably well. Also, the relative magnitudes pre-
serve the data patterns (columns “Rel. std.”). The model underpredicts the persis-
tence of GDP growth, but the first-order autocorrelation of key GDP components
is broadly in line with the data. The correlation between output growth and the
growth rates of consumption, investment, and hours worked is close to the data.
The last column in Table 3 reports the R2 of the 1-year ahead forecast. The pos-
itive value indicates that the forecast errors from the model are not very large.
Overall, the theoretical moments in Table 1 indicate the model’s ability to repli-
cate business cycle features. More elaborate versions of the model have shown
further improvement in the fit while preserving our main results.23
3.2 Model parameters
This section provides the calibrated and estimated parameters. Tables 2 reports
prior distributions and posterior estimation results of model parameters and ex-
ogenous process, respectively. Table 3 presents calibrated parameters.
23See also footnote 4.
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Variable Std. Std(x)/Std(gY) AR(1) Corr(x,gY) R2
Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model 1y ahead
GDP 0.62 0.60 1.00 1.00 0.49 0.30 1.00 1.00 0.33
Consumption 0.54 0.63 0.88 1.06 0.44 0.63 0.68 0.55 0.20
Investment 2.93 3.10 4.71 5.21 0.12 0.11 0.72 0.71 0.03
R&D 1.35 1.53 2.17 2.57 0.32 0.44 0.32 0.24 0.16
Hours worked 0.57 0.60 0.92 1.00 0.70 0.52 0.63 0.69 0.47
GDP deflator 0.25 0.49 0.41 0.83 0.62 0.85 0.19 -0.18 0.40
Real wages 0.70 0.69 1.12 1.16 -0.09 0.11 0.05 0.14 0.04
Table 1: Theoretical moments and model fit.
Notes: Rel. std. and AR(1) refer to the standard deviation relative to output growth (gY) and first
order autorcorrelation, respectively. Theoretical moments are reported for the linear model. We
define the R2 as 1 - the ratio of the 4-step-ahead (one year) forecast error and the deviation of
the observed time series from the model-implied steady state. This definition implies that our R2
has an upper bound at 1 (no forecast errors) and is unbounded from below (the volatility of the
forecast error can exceed the volatility of the time series). R2 declines monotonically as the forecast
error increases. Consumption and investment refer to private GDP components. All variables are
expressed in growth rates.
The growth literature has mostly relied on simple calibration procedures. By
contrast, the rich macroeconomic model allows estimating important parameters
for endogenous growth, such as the parameter determining intertemporal spillover,
ϕ. Its mode estimate (0.93) is below one despite a positive prior density in ϕ = 1.
Hence, the estimation supports semi-endogenous growth in the US economy but
implies significant persistent of movements in endogenous productivity.
This finding is important for policy evaluations. It predicts that R&D policy
shocks cannot permanently affect the per capita GDP growth rate, as originally
predicted by Jones (1995). However, ϕ̂ implies that R&D policy shocks, or any
other shocks directly or indirectly affecting the R&D/GDP ratio, can have rela-
tively long-lasting effects and change the macroeconomic behavior in the medium
term. Despite the sizeable posterior distribution, this estimate suggests that the
policy predictions of the estimated model are, in the short-run, not completely
distinguishable from those of a fully endogenous growth model.24 For example,
changes in IPR policy or legal norms influence incentives to conduct basic or ap-
plied research. A shift away from basic research towards a more narrow focus
on marketable products can have lasting adverse effects on frontier productivity
growth. Following this argument, the persistence of the spillover shock could re-
late to the US common law regime, which implies a gradual transition to new IPR
regimes. In like manner, Cozzi and Galli (2014) argue that a legal change only un-
24A previous version of the paper (Cozzi et al., 2017) considered alternative specifications of the
growth engine including fully endogenous growth.
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Prior distribution Posterior distribution
Distr. Mean Std. Mode 10% 90%
Steady state innovation prob. n̄ Beta 0.03 0.01 0.18 0.17 0.18
Intertemporal spillover ϕ Beta 0.70 0.20 0.93 0.70 0.98
Habit persistence h Beta 0.50 0.20 0.89 0.84 0.92
Risk aversiona θ Gamma 1.50 0.20 1.61 1.26 1.91
Inverse Frisch elasticity θN Gamma 2.50 0.50 2.63 1.68 3.00
Price adj. cost γP Gamma 40.00 10.00 67.01 54.23 85.24
Wage adj. cost γw Gamma 5.00 2.00 3.23 1.85 4.69
Real wage rigidity γwr Beta 0.50 0.20 0.97 0.96 0.98
Labor adj. cost γN Gamma 60.00 40.00 3.35 2.02 4.56
Capacity util. adj. cost γu,2 Gamma 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Investment adj. cost, const. γI,1 Gamma 60.00 40.00 66.39 46.96 84.36
Investment adj. cost, slope γI,2 Gamma 60.00 40.00 9.15 3.27 25.66
R&D adj. cost γRD Gamma 60.00 40.00 197.84 158.77 238.87
Interest rate persistence ρi Beta 0.70 0.12 0.87 0.85 0.91
Response to inflation ηi,φ Beta 2.00 0.40 2.79 2.19 2.90
Response to GDP ηi,y Beta 0.25 0.10 0.12 0.07 0.17
Response to deficit ηb Beta 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
Response to debt ηd f Beta 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Expenditure rule ρG Beta 0.70 0.10 0.99 0.98 0.99
Investment rule ρIG Beta 0.70 0.10 0.99 0.98 0.99
Transfer rule ρtr Beta 0.70 0.10 0.99 0.99 1.00
R&D risk premium ρAY Beta 0.50 0.20 0.97 0.95 0.98
Government risk premium ρB Beta 0.50 0.20 0.91 0.84 0.94
Discount factor ρC Beta 0.50 0.20 0.69 0.60 0.78
Price mark-up ρMUY Beta 0.50 0.20 0.79 0.68 0.84
Labor demand ρND Beta 0.50 0.20 0.84 0.79 0.88
Investment risk premium ρS Beta 0.50 0.20 0.97 0.94 0.98
Knowledge spillover ρσ Beta 0.50 0.20 0.97 0.95 0.98
Lump-sum tax ρT Beta 0.50 0.20 0.93 0.92 0.97
Monetary policy ui Gamma 1.00 0.40 0.12 0.11 0.14
Government investment uIG Gamma 1.00 0.40 0.05 0.04 0.05
Government consumption uG Gamma 1.00 0.40 0.07 0.07 0.08
Government transfers utr Gamma 1.00 0.40 0.11 0.10 0.13
R&D risk premium uAY Gamma 1.00 0.40 5.37 4.90 5.90
Government risk premium uB Gamma 1.00 0.40 0.16 0.15 0.18
Discount factor uC Gamma 1.00 0.40 2.15 1.23 3.10
Price mark-up uMUY Gamma 2.00 0.80 4.33 3.43 6.35
Labor demand uND Gamma 0.50 0.20 2.14 1.76 2.60
Investment risk premium uS Gamma 1.00 0.40 0.29 0.28 0.48
Knowledge spillover uσ Gamma 1.00 0.40 5.90 5.83 5.90
Lump-sum tax uT Gamma 1.00 0.40 0.72 0.65 0.79
Wage mark-up uU Gamma 1.00 0.40 1.79 1.20 2.54
Table 2: Estimated parameters and shocks
aNot accounting for the labor margin. See footnote 26.
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Innovation and growth
R&D decreasing returns η 11.530
R&D externality λA 0.128
Knowledge spillovers (steady state) σRD 0.006
Preferences
Preference for govt bonds αB 0.002
Preference for stocks αS 0.012
Intertemporal discount factor β 0.990
Weight of disutility of labor ωN 17.584
Production
Cobb-Douglas labor share a 0.650
Depreciation of capital stock δ 0.012
Linear capacity utilization adj. costs γu,1 0.025
Wage markup (steady state) µw 1.200
Demand elasticity σy -29.452
Fiscal policy
Consumption tax τC 0.200
Corporate profit tax τK 0.300
Labor tax τN 0.227
Debt target b 3.400
Deficit target d f 0.039
Steady state ratios
Private consumption share C/Y 0.692
Private investment share I/Y 0.126
Govt interest payment share (1 + iB)BB/Y 0.045
Govt consumption share CG/Y 0.153
Govt investment share IG/Y 0.042
Transfers share TR/Y 0.118
Wage share W/Y 0.595
R&D investment share XRD/Y 0.015
Table 3: Calibrated parameters.
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folds its full economic consequences after a long enough series of court precedents
have been ruled.25
Quite striking is also the estimate of the R&D adjustment costs parameter, γRD.
Its estimated posterior mode, 197.84, is the highest adjustment cost parameter of
the whole model. This value suggests that the R&D and growth models in the
academic literature so far, by ignoring R&D adjustment costs, lead to potentially
misleading predictions on the effect of policies on growth. High R&D adjustment
costs indicate that the R&D response to policies could be much more sluggish than
usually thought.
The estimated business cycle parameters imply slow adjustment of employ-
ment and capital, and significant nominal rigidities. The high estimated habit
persistence (0.89) mirrors the sluggish response of consumption to income. The
estimates of risk aversion (1.61) and inverse Frisch elasticity (2.63) are in line with
other macro models.26 The estimated persistence of fiscal rules is high.
3.3 Model dynamics
This section briefly describes impulse response functions of main structural shocks.
Investment risk premium and savings disturbances are Keynesian demand shocks.
By contrast, R&D spillover shocks capture supply-side factors. All shocks are as-
sumed temporary, i.e. lasting only one term.
Consider first an exogenous shock to the investment risk premium shown in
Figure 3 (dashed, red). This risk premium does affect not only physical capital
investment, but also entail direct and indirect consequences on R&D investment
and ultimately on innovation and productivity growth. The direct effects could
be negative due to less aggregate investment in general. However, they could
also be positive for R&D, if the shock liberates savings that would otherwise go
to a different form of investment. Indirect effects are likely negative due. By re-
ducing investment, lower physical capital investment will decrease the market
size of innovative intermediate products, thereby decreasing the profitability of
R&D. In the estimated model, the adverse effects dominate. The increase in the
investment risk premium reduces GDP and R&D investment. Initially, the shock
crowds in consumption. In the medium run, the consumption response turns neg-
ative owing to lower wage income. The strong adverse effects on output suggest
that fluctuations in investment risk premia generate responses that resemble key
25R&D spillover shocks are very persistent. The 90 percent interval of the R&D spillover shock
persistence, ρσ, ranges from 0.95 to 0.98.
26 Strictly speaking, a measure of risk aversion would need to account for the labor margin
(Swanson, 2012).
21
elements of the slowdown. However, the mild fall in productivity and the con-
sumption response indicates that this shock cannot explain all salient facts. By
contrast, consumer savings shocks (yellow, dotted) reduce consumption directly.
However, higher savings increase investment and R&D expenditure and the neg-
ative on effect on output is relatively short-lived. Below we show that the joint
behavior of investment risk premium and consumer savings shocks captures the
rapid contraction during the crisis.
The presence of R&D in the model identifies another potential source of the
slow recovery: stochastic technology spillover. The blue solid lines in Figure 3
depict the IRFs following a negative temporary shock to R&D spillovers. Even
though R&D expenditure recovers faster than in the case of investment risk premia
shock, the drop in productivity is equally persistent. The adverse effects on R&D
investment and protracted slowdown of productivity suggests that the spillover
shock is a good candidate for explaining the slow recovery. However, the fall in
GDP remains smaller than for investment risk premia shocks. Spillover shocks
cannot explain the rapid contraction in demand components observed during the
Great Recession.
3.4 Historical decomposition
This section quantifies the relative contribution of exogenous shocks in explaining
the data through the lens of the estimated DSGE model with endogenous Schum-
peterian growth. Figure 4 presents a historical shock decomposition of real GDP
growth. The continuous line displays the observed time series. Stacked vertical
bars indicate the estimated relative contribution of different shocks in a given pe-
riod. The contribution of all shocks recovers the observed time series.
According to the results, fluctuations in investment risk premia (pink) and pri-
vate savings (black) contribute most to the Great Recession. The decline in GDP
growth associated with the financial crisis is closely related to these shocks. Their
joint occurrence reflects a sudden and sharp deterioration of financial intermedi-
ation. The credit channels from household savings to private firms investing in
physical capital and R&D became less reliable than before. Production and R&D
could not get funding comparable to the pre-crisis trend. At the same time, house-
holds became more pessimistic about the future. The increased propensity to save
led to a drop in consumption expenditure. As a result of the simultaneous reduc-
tions in consumption and investment, aggregate private demand and GDP growth
fell.
At first, monetary policy turned to an expansionary stance, reflected by the
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Figure 3: Impulse response functions of selected shocks
Notes: This figure displays the dynamic responses to exogenous shocks of an one estimated stan-
dard deviation. Blue solid (red dashed) [yellow dotted] lines show the effects of a negative R&D
spillover (positive investment risk premium) [consumption savings] shocks. Variables are dis-
played in percentage deviations from their steady-state value. The figure reports the interest rate
and inflation in annualized percentage points. Impulse responses are displayed for 40 periods,
corresponding to 10 years.
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Figure 4: Historical decomposition of real GDP growth (year-on-year)
Notes: This figure shows a historical shock decomposition of real GDP growth. The black contin-
uous line displays demeaned series of real GDP growth (year-on-year). Vertical bars indicate the
relative contribution of each (group of) shocks to (i) fiscal policy rules (blue), (ii) monetary policy
(light green), (iii) price markups (red), (iv) saving preferences (black) (v) investment risk premia
(pink), (vi) labor demand (dark green), (vii) wage markups (yellow), as well as innovation-specific
shocks, such as shocks to (viii) the R&D risk premium (light blue) and (ix) R&D spillovers (brown).
All remaining shocks (x) are grouped in Others (gray). Appendix C provides additional technical
details on the shock decomposition.
positive contribution of innovations to the Taylor rule (green). However, when
nominal interest rates hit the ZLB, the Fed became unable to lower the policy
rate further into the negative territory, as would have been dictated by the pre-
crisis Taylor rule. Therefore, monetary policy failed to give enough relief to finan-
cially strained firms and households. Other aspects of the Fed’s policy, however,
have helped repair the post-crisis financial intermediation. In fact, the negative
contribution of the investment risk premium and saving shocks vanishes from
2010 onwards. The model estimation also suggests that discretionary fiscal pol-
icy (blue) stabilized the US economy only initially. Its cumulative contribution to
GDP growth became negative in the second part of 2009.27
Following the crisis, firms have been subject to a more competitive environ-
ment. Reduced price markup (red) exerted a positive GDP effect. By contrast, the
labor market appears to have suffered rigidities in the two years after the crisis,
represented by wage markup shocks (yellow).
27This observation may also reflect the expectation of higher future taxes associated with the
persistently higher government spending.
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Figure 5: Historical decomposition of R&D investment growth (year-on-year)
Notes: This figure shows a historical shock decomposition of real R&D investment growth. The
black continuous line displays demeaned series of real R&D investment growth (year-on-year).
Vertical bars indicate the relative contribution of each (group of) shocks to (i) fiscal policy rules
(blue), (ii) monetary policy (light green), (iii) price markups (red), (iv) saving preferences (black)
(v) investment risk premia (pink), (vi) labor demand (dark green), (vii) wage markups (yellow), as
well as innovation-specific shocks, such as shocks to (viii) the R&D risk premium (light blue) and
(ix) R&D spillovers (brown). All remaining shocks (x) are grouped in Others (gray). Appendix C
provides additional technical details on the shock decomposition.
The period around the dot-com bubble burst is also noteworthy. A strongly
expansionary monetary policy stance and supportive fiscal policy at least partially
offset the adverse financial conditions associated with persistent investment and
saving shocks.
The estimated model identifies the importance of R&D and innovation for fluc-
tuations in GDP growth. We observe a persistently negative contribution of the
R&D spillover shock (brown) starting in 2002. According to the Schumpeterian
growth model, basic aspects of R&D push the aggregate technological frontier fur-
ther. The model estimation suggests that R&D activities since this time have had
a lower basic content, which has reduced technological spillovers. The strength of
this supply-side channel is remarkable, given the rich Keynesian demand features
of the model. While our model cannot pin down the precise underlying drivers
of this shock, it complements views expressed in other studies. For example, the
shock contribution could reflect that new technologies do not share the same gen-
eral applicability in a wide range of economic sectors. This interpretation squares
with Gordon’s (2017) hypothesis that advances in ICT have exhausted a large part
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of their growth potential and were already widely adopted around 2004. It could
also relate to changes in the institutional or legal landscape, in which innovation
takes place. Cozzi and Galli (2014) emphasize the harmful effects of too strict
IPRs after the Madey vs Duke Supreme Court verdict of 2002. This court decision
has likely negatively affected academic and basic research in the US innovation
system. It formally ended the “research exemption” doctrine, which previously
permitted researchers to use patented discoveries without incurring the risk of
patent infringement.
Except for the technology boom from 1995-2001, contributions from Schum-
peterian technology shocks are negligible before the 2000s. This finding suggests
that the slow recovery contains essential Schumpeterian elements: Technology
dynamics are crucial to understanding why the recovery after the Great Recession
was different from previous recessions.
How does the model interpret the time series on R&D investment? Figure 5
presents a decomposition of R&D investment. The estimation explains the drop
in R&D investment mainly by effects of financial distress. The malfunctioning of
financial markets has a strong adverse effect on R&D investment. The constrained
ability of financial markets to channel savings thus helps explain the low growth
following the Great Recession. Apart from the dot-com bubble and the short pre-
crisis boom, R&D spillovers affect R&D investment mostly negative. Moreover,
labor market and monetary policy shocks contribute to fluctuations in R&D in-
vestment.
3.5 Adverse innovation dynamics
This section analyzes the Schumpeterian features of our model estimation in more
detail. An important hypothesis in the debate on low growth is that the US econ-
omy’s innovation capacity has slowed down before the Great Recession. Gordon
(2017) argues that the growth effects of postwar technological innovation and busi-
ness re-organization have been harvested, and spillover effects become smaller. In
a similar vein, Bloom et al. (2020) ask whether ideas are getting harder to find as a
range of studies and data suggest that more and more research effort needs to be
devoted to discoveries. Given its endogenous innovation structure, our approach
contributes to this discussion.
Figure 1 shows that R&D investment dropped after the 2001 dot-com bubble
burst. However, this was not (directly) followed by the downward trend shift in
output as observed in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis. To explore this
important difference through the lens of our model, Figure 6 tracks the implied
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Figure 6: Estimated innovation dynamics
Notes: This figure depicts (detrended and standardized) smoothed estimates of endogenous vari-
ables related to innovation.
evolution of frontier technology, AY,maxt , labor-augmenting productivity, A
Y
t , and
adoption, nt−1
(
AY,maxt − A
Y
t−1
)
.28
We find model-based evidence of a slowdown of frontier growth at around
2001. The technology boom before the burst of the dot-com bubble led to an in-
crease in frontier technology. Average productivity increased following the adop-
tion of innovations to the general economy. The 2001 crisis generated a strong drop
in R&D. Reduced technology adoption and the downward turning point of the
(detrended) frontier technology reflect this contraction. Weaker innovation grad-
ually exhausted the stock of available unadopted technologies,
(
AY,maxt − A
Y
t−1
)
.
At the time of the financial crisis, this stock was substantially lower than in 2001.
Gradually, the deterioration of the frontier led to a slowdown of the average tech-
nological pace. As a consequence, aggregate productivity remained persistently
below trend. Therefore, the interaction of (semi-)endogenous frontier growth and
endogenous adoption suggests that technology dynamics in the early 2000s play
an important role in the slow recovery.
28Notice that all variables in Figure 6 are shown as standardized deviations from their long-term
value. This explains why productivity seems to get higher than frontier technology (which is of
course impossible) and adoption to get negative.
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4 Conclusion
The macroeconomic experience of the last decade has stressed the importance of
jointly studying the growth and fluctuations behavior of the economy. Medium-
run dynamics and the business cycle are intertwined, suggesting the need to quan-
tify drivers of these quite complex dynamics. To that aim, we have developed an
integrated medium-scale DSGE model featuring a rich New Keynesian part in the
spirit of Smets and Wouters (2003) as well as a Schumpeterian (semi-)endogenous
growth engine. As in Aghion and Howitt (1992) and Nuño (2011), innovations
are the outcome of a patent-race, with each innovation improving upon existing
goods. Innovating firms replace the incumbent monopolist and earn higher prof-
its until the next innovation occurs. Knowledge spillovers push the technological
frontier further.
Results from a Bayesian estimation underline the importance of Keynesian de-
mand shocks. Fluctuations in investment risk premia and saving behavior explain
the depth of the Great Recession. In line with recent literature (e.g. Gust et al.
2017), we interpret this finding as malfunctioning financial intermediation. The
endogenous innovation channel further amplifies the effects of financial shocks.
Endogenous growth links supply and demand as demand-side shocks also drive
dynamics of R&D and productivity.
Despite the strength of Keynesian channels, the model estimation challenges
the claim that the slump is a pure demand-side phenomenon. We identify ad-
verse supply-side factors such as a decline of the innovative capacity and frontier
technology well before the financial turmoil. Indeed, the estimation suggests that
adverse supply-side developments have been partially responsible for the long-
lasting slowdown. The slow-moving adverse innovation dynamics then led to
gradual exhaustion of remaining (unadopted) innovations. When the financial
crisis arrived, it struck the innovative system in an already weak state, and forced
the economy into a period of protracted low growth.
28
References
Acemoglu, D., U. Akcigit, H. Alp, N. Bloom, and W. Kerr (2018). Innovation,
reallocation, and growth. American Economic Review 108(11), 3450–91.
Aghion, P. and P. Howitt (1992). A model of growth through creative destruction.
Econometrica 60(2), 323–51.
Anzoategui, D., D. Comin, M. Gertler, and J. Martinez (2019). Endogenous tech-
nology adoption and r&d as sources of business cycle persistence. American
Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 11(3), 67–110.
Benigno, G. and L. Fornaro (2017). Stagnation traps. The Review of Economic Stud-
ies 85(3), 1425–1470.
Bianchi, F., H. Kung, and G. Morales (2019). Growth, slowdowns, and recoveries.
Journal of Monetary Economics 101, 47 – 63.
Blanchard, O. and J. Galí (2007). Real wage rigidities and the New Keynesian
model. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 39, 35–65.
Bloom, N., C. I. Jones, J. Van Reenen, and M. Webb (2020). Are ideas getting harder
to find? American Economic Review 110(4), 1104–44.
Cette, G., J. Fernald, and B. Mojon (2016). The pre-great recession slowdown in
productivity. European Economic Review 88, 3 – 20. SI: The Post-Crisis Slump.
Christiano, L. J., M. S. Eichenbaum, and M. Trabandt (2015). Understanding the
Great Recession. American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 7(1), 110–167.
Comin, D. and M. Gertler (2006). Medium-term business cycles. American Eco-
nomic Review 96(3), 523–551.
Cozzi, G. and S. Galli (2014). Sequential R&D and blocking patents in the dynam-
ics of growth. Journal of Economic Growth 19(2), 183–219.
Cozzi, G., B. Pataracchia, M. Ratto, and P. Pfeiffer (2017). How much Keynes and
how much Schumpeter? An estimated macromodel of the US economy. MPRA
Paper 77771, University Library of Munich, Germany.
Del Negro, M., G. B. Eggertsson, A. Ferrero, and N. Kiyotaki (2016). The great
escape? a quantitative evaluation of the Fed’s liquidity facilities. American Eco-
nomic Review.
29
Erkal, N. and S. Scotchmer (2011). Scarcity of ideas and R&D options: Use it, lose
it or bank it. Mimeo.
Fisher, J. D. (2015). On the structural interpretation of the Smets-Wouters “risk
premium” shock. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 47(2-3), 511–516.
Foster, L., J. C. Haltiwanger, and C. J. Krizan (2001). Aggregate Productivity Growth:
Lessons from Microeconomic Evidence, pp. 303–372. University of Chicago Press.
Frankel, M. (1962). The production function in allocation and growth: A synthesis.
American Economic Review 52(5), 996–1022.
Giovannini, M., P. Pfeiffer, and M. Ratto (2020). Efficient and robust inference of
models with occasionally binding constraints. Mimeo.
Gordon, R. J. (2017). The rise and fall of American growth: The US standard of living
since the civil war, Volume 70. Princeton University Press.
Guerrieri, L. and M. Iacoviello (2015). OccBin: A toolkit for solving dynamic mod-
els with occasionally binding constraints easily. Journal of Monetary Economics 70,
22 – 38.
Guerron-Quintana, P. A. and R. Jinnai (2019). Financial frictions, trends, and the
Great Recession. Quantitative Economics 10(2), 735–773.
Gust, C., E. Herbst, D. López-Salido, and M. E. Smith (2017). The empirical im-
plications of the interest-rate lower bound. American Economic Review 107(7),
1971–2006.
Hall, R. E. (2011). The high sensitivity of economic activity to financial frictions*.
The Economic Journal 121(552), 351–378.
Howitt, P. and P. Aghion (1998). Capital Accumulation and Innovation as Comple-
mentary Factors in Long-Run Growth. Journal of Economic Growth 3(2), 111–130.
Jones, C. I. (1995). R&D-based models of economic growth. Journal of Political
Economy 103(4), 759–84.
Jones, C. I. and J. C. Williams (2000). Too much of a good thing? The economics of
investment in R&D. Journal of Economic Growth 5(1), 65–85.
Kogan, L., D. Papanikolaou, A. Seru, and N. Stoffman (2017). Technological in-
novation, resource allocation and growth. The Quarterly Journal of Economics.
forthcoming.
30
Kollmann, R., B. Pataracchia, R. Raciborski, M. Ratto, W. Roeger, and L. Vogel
(2016). The post-crisis slump in the Euro Area and the US: Evidence from an
estimated three-region DSGE model. European Economic Review 88(C), 21–41.
Krishnamurthy, A. and A. Vissing-Jorgensen (2012). The aggregate demand for
treasury debt. Journal of Political Economy 120(2), 233–267.
Maih, J. (2015). Efficient perturbation methods for solving regime-switching DSGE
models. Working Paper 2015/01, Norges Bank.
Nuño, G. (2011). Optimal research and development and the cost of business
cycles. Journal of Economic Growth 16(3), 257–283.
Oikawa, K. and K. Ueda (2015). State-Dependent Pricing, Firm Entry and Exit,
and Non-Neutrality of Money. CAMA Working Papers (2015-03).
Oikawa, K. and K. Ueda (2018). The optimal inflation rate under schumpeterian
growth. Journal of Monetary Economics 100, 114 – 125.
Oikawa, K. and K. Ueda (2019). Short- and long-run tradeoff of monetary easing.
Journal of the Japanese and International Economies 52, 189 – 200.
Pinchetti, M. (2020). What is driving the TFP slowdown? Insights from a Schum-
peterian DSGE model. MPRA Working Paper.
Romer, P. M. (1986). Increasing returns and long-run growth. Journal of Political
Economy 94(5), 1002–1037.
Rozsypal, F. (2016). Schumpeterian business cycles. Mimeo.
Sidrauski, M. (1967). Rational Choice and Patterns of Growth in a Monetary Econ-
omy. American Economic Papers and Proceedings 57(2), 534–544.
Smets, F. and R. Wouters (2003). An estimated dynamic stochastic general equi-
librium model of the euro area. Journal of the European Economic Association 1(5),
1123–1175.
Swanson, E. T. (2012). Risk aversion and the labor margin in dynamic equilibrium
models. American Economic Review 102(4), 1663–91.
Varga, J., W. Roeger, and J. in ’t Veld (2016). Financial crisis and TFP growth in the
euro area. Mimeo.
31
Vitek, F. (2017). Policy, risk and spillover analysis in the world economy. a panel
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium approach. IMF Working Papers 17/89,
International Monetary Fund.
32
A Model details
The notation follows the main text.
A.1 Households
Denoting the Lagrangian multiplier on the budget constraint (1) by λj,t, the cumulative discount
factor shock Θt ≡ exp
(
∑
t−1
τ=0 ε
C
τ
)
, and thus
Θt+1
Θt
=
exp
(
∑
t
τ=0 ε
C
τ
)
exp
(
∑
t−1
τ=0 ε
C
τ
) = εCt .
The first-order optimality conditions of the household problem in a symmetric equilibrium are as
follows.
Consumption Ct:
λt = Θt
(Ct − hCt−1)
−θ
(1 + τC)
(A.1)
Risk-free assets B
r f
t :
1 = βEt
[
λt+1
λt
Pt
Pt+1
(1 + it)
]
(A.2)
Government bonds BBt :
1 = βEt
[
λt+1
λt
Pt
Pt+1
1
1 + αB + εBt
(
(1 + iBt )
)
]
(A.3)
Firm shares St:
1 = βEt
[
λt+1
λt
Pt
Pt+1
1
1 + αS + εSt
(
(1 + iSt+1)
)
]
(A.4)
For latter reference, we define the (stock market) stochastic discount factor as:
βEt
[
λt+1
λt
1
1 + αS + εSt
]
≡ Et
[
Λt,t+1
]
. (A.5)
The term 1
1+αS+εSt
creates an exogenous wedge between the intertemporal marginal rate of substi-
tution of household and the (stock market) stochastic discount factor. This approach is a short-cut
for capturing financial frictions facing the firm. It can, e.g., be interpreted as a “principal agent
friction” between the owner and the management of the firm (Hall (2011)). Equation (A.4) can be
written as:
1 = Et
[
Λt,t+1
Pt
Pt+1
(
(1 + iSt+1)
)
]
. (A.6)
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A.2 Wage Setting
Labor packers. Labor packers have access to a CES production technology:
Nt =
(∫ 1
0
N
σn−1
σn
j,t dj
) σn
σn−1
(A.7)
where σn denotes the substitution elasticity. The labor packers maximize output
max
{Nj,t}
WtNt −
∫ 1
0
Wj,tNj,tdj = Wt
(∫ 1
0
N
σn−1
σn
t dj
) σn
σn−1
−
∫ 1
0
Wj,tNj,tdj. (A.8)
Combining the first-order condition with a zero-profit condition gives their labor demand
Nj,t =
(
Wj,t
Wt
)−σn
Nt. (A.9)
Unions. The Online Appendix provides the detailed algebra. Trade unions maximize a dis-
counted future stream of the household’s utility:
max
Wj,t
Uj0 =
∞
∑
t=0
βtu(Cj,t, Nj,t, ·). (A.10)
Utility maximization is subject to the demand from labor packers (A.9) and the household budget
constraint. Nominal wage adjustment costs follow ΓWt =
(σn−1)γw
2 WtNt
(
πWj,t − π
w
)2
, where πWt =
Wj,t
Wj,t−1
− 1 denotes quarterly wage inflation. This specification implies that the costs of deviating
from steady state wage inflation (πw) are scaled by the wage bill and a constant factor.
This optimization problem gives rise to the following Lagrangian:
LW = E0
∞
∑
t=0
βtΘt
{
(Cj,t − hCt−1)
1−θ
1 − θ
− ωNt
(
Nj,t
)1+θN
1 + θN
− U Bj,t/P
C,vat
t ×
(
Ct − hCt−1
)−θ
−
λt
PC,vatt
[
PC,vatt Cj,t + B
B
j,t + B
r f
j,t + P
S
t St + exp(ε
T
t )Tj,t + Γ
W
t −
(
1 − τN
)
Wj,tNj,t + (1 + i
B
t−1)B
B
j,t−1 + (1 + it−1)B
r f
j,t−1 + (1 + i
S
t )Sj,t−1 + TRj,t + ΠtPt
]}
, (A.11)
with ΓWt =
(σn−1)γw
2 WtNt
(
Wj,t
Wj,t−1
− 1 − πw
)2
.
Define VNj,t ≡ Θtω
N (Ct)
1−θ Nθ
N
j,t , the first-order condition reads:
LW
∂Wj,t
= −VNj,t (−σ
n)
(Wj,t
Wt
)−σn−1 Nt
Wt
+
λt
PC,vatt
[
(1 − τN)Wj,t(−σ
n)
(Wj,t
Wt
)−σn−1 Nt
Wt
+
(
1 − τN
)
Nj,t − (σ
n − 1)γwWtNt
1
Wj,t−1
( Wj,t
Wj,t−1
− 1 − πw
)]
+ βEt
[
λt+1
PC,vatt+1
(
(σn − 1)γwWt+1Nt+1
Wj,t+1
W2j,t
(Wj,t+1
Wj,t
− 1 − πw
))
]
= 0, (A.12)
dropping j subscripts due to symmetry (same hours and wages across households Nj,t = Nt and
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Wj,t = Wt), defining µ
W ≡ σ
n
(σn−1)
, and mrst ≡
VNt
λt
, and allowing for real wage rigidity as in
Blanchard and Galí (2007), governed by parameter γwr, labor supply follows
(
µwmrst
)1−γwr [
(1 − τN)Wt−1
Pt−1
]γwr
=
Wt
Pt
[
(1 − τN) + γw(πWt + 1)
(
πWt − π
w
)]
− βEt
[
λt+1
λt
PC,vatt
PC,vatt+1
1/Pt
(
γwWt+1
Nt+1
Nt
(πWt+1 + 1)
(
πWt+1 − π
w
))
]
+
Wt
Pt
uUt , (A.13)
where we include the labor supply shock uUt .
A.3 Intermediate good firms
Firms maximize a stream of future dividends di,t equal to a discounted stream of future dividends,
Vt = dt + Et [Λt,t+1Vt+1] where Λt,t+1 corresponds to the households discount factor as derived in
equation (A.5). Firms choose labor, capacity utilization, and prices.
Period t dividends in real terms are:
di,t =
(
1 − τK
)(Pi,t
Pt
Yi,t −
Wt
Pt
Ni,t
)
− adji,t, (A.14)
where Wt is the wage rate, τ
K is the profit tax, δ is capital depreciation rate and adji,t are total
adjustment costs associated with adjustment of prices Pi,t, capacity utilization cui,t and labor input
Ni,t adjustment.
For tractability, we make two more assumptions. (i) When a new incumbent starts production,
she inherits the previous stocks (employment, capital) and costs of the previous firm that dropped
out. (ii) As discussed in the main text, moving closer to the frontier implies higher adjustment
costs due to sophistication. As a consequence, adjustment costs reflect the relative technological
position
(
AYi,t
AYt
)
of the sector i. Thus,
adji,t = adj
P
i,t + adj
N
i,t + adj
cu
i,t (A.15)
with
adjPi,t =
γp
2
Yt
(
Pi,t
Pi,t−1
− exp(π)
)2
(
AYi,t
AYt
)
(A.16)
adjNi,t =
γn
2
Yt
(
Ni,t
Ni,t−1
− exp(gpop)
)2
(
AYi,t
AYt
)
(A.17)
adjcui,t = K
tot
t−1
(
γu,1 (cui,t − 1) +
γu,2
2
(cui,t − 1)
2
)(
AYi,t
AYt
)
(A.18)
where π and gpop denote steady state inflation and population growth. Firms maximize dividends
subject to the production technology (8) and the demand schedule for final goods, equation (A.28),
Yi,t =
(
Pi,t
Pt
)−σy
Yt. µt will denote the multiplier on the production technology (8). We allow for
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shocks to labor demand and price mark-ups, denoted ǫNDt and ǫ
MUY
t , respectively. In a symmetric
equilibrium, the first-order conditions are:
Nt : (1 − τ
K)
Wt
Pt
=
(
µt − ε
ND
t
)
α
Yt
Nt
−
∂adjNt
∂Nt
+ Et
[
Λt,t+1
∂adjNt+1
∂Nt
]
, (A.19)
cut : K
tot
t−1
[
γu,1 + γu,2(cut − 1)
]
= µt(1 − α)
Yt
cut
(A.20)
Pt : µtσ
y = (1 − τK)(σy − 1) + σyγP
Pt
Pt−1
(
πt − π̄
)
− σyγP
[
Λt,t+1
Pt+1
Pt
Yt+1
Yt
(
πt+1 − π̄
)
]
+ σyεMUYt . (A.21)
A.3.1 Investment
Investment is carried out by an investment fund owned by households. The fund perfectly in-
ternalizes choices of the firms. The (private) capital stock at each firm i accumulates according to
Ki,t = (1 − δ)Ki,t−1 + Ii,t, (A.22)
and is subject to investment adjustment costs:
adjIi,t =


γI,1
2
Kt−1
(
Ii,t
Ktott−1
− δt
)2
+
γI,2
2
(
Ii,t − exp(g
Y + π)Ii,t−1
)2
Ktott−1


(
AYi,t
At
)
, (A.23)
Optimal choices of capital and investment imply in a symmetric equilibrium:
Qt = Et
[
Λt,t+1
(
τKδ −
∂adjCUt
∂Kt−1
+ Qt+1(1 − δ) + (1 − α)µt+1
Ykt+1
Ktott
)]
, (A.24)
and
Qt =
[
1 + γI,1
( It
Kt−1
− δKt
)
+ γI,2
(It − It−1)
Kt−1
]
−Et
[
Λt,t+1exp(g
Y + π)γI,2
(It+1 − Itexp(g
Y + π))
Kt
]
. (A.25)
Equation (A.24) and (A.25) define Tobin’s Q, the replacement cost of capital (the multiplier on
(A.22)). gY denotes steady-state growth.
A.4 Final good producers
Output (Yt) is produced by perfectly competitive firms by combining a large number of differ-
entiated goods, Yi,t, produced by monopolistically competitive firms. Final good producers have
access to a CES production technology:
Yt =
[ ∫ 1
0
Y
σy−1
σy
i,t di
] σy
σy−1
(A.26)
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Firms choose Yi,t, taking Pi,t as given.
max
Yi,t
Pt
[ ∫ 1
0
Y
σy−1
σy
i,t di
] σy
σy−1 −
∫ 1
0
Pi,tYi,tdi (A.27)
The resulting demand for a differentiated good i is:
Yi,t =
(Pi,t
Pt
)−σy
Yt (A.28)
where σy is inversely related to the steady state price mark-up. The corresponding price index is:
Pt =
[ ∫ 1
0
(Pi,t)
1−σy di
] 1
1−σy
(A.29)
A.5 Entrepreneurs
The R&D entrepreneurial problem is to maximize profits:
max
XRDi,t
= ni,t
[
PSmaxi,t
Pt
]
−
[
XRDi,t +
γRD
2Yt
(XRDi,t − X
RD
t−1gY)
2,
] (
1 + εAYt
)
(A.30)
R&D investment optimality:
nt
(η + 1)
[
PSmaxt
Pt
]
= XRDt
(
γRD
Yt
(XRDt − X
RD
t−1gY)
)
(1 + εAYt ) (A.31)
Probability of innovation:29
ni,t =
(
XRDi,t
λRD Amaxi,t
) 1
(η+1)
(A.32)
29We verify that XRDi,t < λ
RD Amaxt+1 .
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B Estimation data
All data sets (unless otherwise noted) are post-war US data observed from 1983Q1 on. Data of
macroeconomic observables come from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) and the Federal
Reserve. We use quarterly R&D data from the US. Bureau of Economic Analysis (NIPA Table
5.3.5. Private Fixed Investment by Type). The data are seasonally adjusted at annual rates. In
particular, we employ the series on intellectual property rights Y001RC1 from which we subtract
the investment in Entertainment, literary, and artistic originals (Y020RC1). The data are available
at http://www.bea.gov/national/nipaweb/DownSS2.asp.
Observables include time series of:
1. Real GDP
2. GDP deflator
3. Nominal interest rate
4. Consumption
5. Investment
6. Wage share
7. Population
8. R&D investment
9. Hours worked
10. Trend TFP
11. Activity rate.
We also include a set of fiscal variables as observables:
12. Government consumption
13. Government investment
14. Government interest payments
15. Government transfers
16. Public debt
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C Nonlinear estimation
C.1 Overview
We build on the OccBin toolkit (Guerrieri and Iacoviello 2015) to account for the occasionally
binding constraint on nominal interest rates. This method handles the constraints as different
regimes of the same model in which the constraints are either slack or binding. Consequently,
our model consists of two regimes: an unconstrained baseline, and a regime in which the ZLB
constraint binds. Importantly, the dynamics in both regimes depend on the endogenous length of
that regime. The expected duration, in turn, depends on the state variables and exogenous dis-
turbances. As emphasized in Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2015), this interaction can result in highly
nonlinear dynamics.
Following Giovannini et al. (2020), we integrate the nonlinear solution into a specially adapted
Kalman filter and estimate the model with the occasionally binding constraint. This approach is
based on the so-called Piecewise Kalman filter (PKF), a particular form of nonlinear filter where the
state-space representation becomes time-varying. At each time period, the filter proceeds in two
steps. The first, the prediction step, is standard in the filtering of non-linear models. The second
(update) step is tailored to the piecewise-linear model. In a nutshell, the update step entails an
iterative convergence procedure for the temporary binding regime materializing in each period,
that ensures that occasionally binding constraints are not violated. Giovannini et al. (2020) embed
this iterative algorithm into a diffuse Kalman filter.
C.2 Details of the algorithm
The algorithm follows Giovannini et al. (2020). Let us define the local linear representation of the
policy function of the DSGE model featuring OBC solved with the piecewise linear approach:
xt = T(xt−1, εt)xt−1 + C(xt−1, εt) + R(xt−1, εt)εt (C.1)
where xt is the vector of endogenous variables in deviation from the steady state of the ‘base-
line’ (normal time) regime. εt is the vector of shocks. The reduced form matrices T C and R are
state-dependent. They are functions of the lagged states and the current period shocks (note that
C(0, 0) = 0 under the ‘baseline’ regime equilibrium).
In every period t, the piecewise linear solution ensures that, given the lagged states and the
current shocks, the constraints are never violated for all periods s ∈ [t, ∞). The state matrices need
to be updated in the new period t + 1. A new shock in t + 1 can change the future sequence of
state matrices expected given the shock in t, Ts(xt−1, εt) Cs(xt−1, εt) and Rs(xt−1, εt). The one step
recursion of the solution algorithm implies, in general, that:
T(xt−1, εt) 6= T(xt, εt+1)
C(xt−1, εt) 6= C(xt, εt+1)
R(xt−1, εt) 6= R(xt, εt+1)
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To ease notation, let us re-define the state matrices as:
Tt|t = T(xt−1, εt)
Ct|t = C(xt−1, εt)
Rt|t = R(xt−1, εt)
Tt|t−1 = T(xt−1, 0)
Ct|t−1 = C(xt−1, 0)
Rt|t−1 = R(xt−1, 0)
State filtering and the likelihood. Assume we want to estimate the deep parameters of
the model, given a set of observables yt linked to xt by the observation equation
yt = Hxt (C.2)
where, for simplicity and without loss of generality, we assume no observation error. Let denote
as zt, the observations for yt.
30
Given the initial state mean and variance:
x0, P0
and denoting their ‘best’ estimate thereof at any time t − 1 as
xt−1|t−1, Pt−1|t−1, (C.3)
the prediction step for states and observables reads:
xt|t−1 = Tt|t−1 · xt−1|t−1 + Ct|t−1 (C.4)
Pt|t−1 = Tt|t−1 · Pt−1|t−1 · T
′
t|t−1
yt|t−1 = Hxt|t−1
Ft = H · Pt|t−1 · H
′
The prediction step (C.4) is standard in filtering of nonlinear models, e.g. it is the same as for the
extended Kalman Filter.
The update step is the critical element of the piecewise linear Kalman filter (PKF). It is tailored
to the piecewise linear solution. The update step entails the following iterative procedure, which
mimics the analog iterative procedure applied to simulate the model with the piecewise linear
approach.
We initialize the guess of the updated state matrices as:
T(0)t|t = Tt|t−1
R(0)t|t = Rt|t−1
C(0)t|t = Ct|t−1
30We initialize the filter with the unconditional mean and variance of the ‘baseline’ regime with
diffuse priors.
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Then, we iterate until convergence. Each iteration j follows the algorithm:
1. take the prediction step for the guess matrices T(j − 1)t|t,R(0)t|t, C(0)t|t:
x(j)t|t−1 = T(j − 1)t|t · xt−1|t−1 + C(j − 1)t|t (C.5)
P(j)t|t−1 = T(j − 1)t|t · Pt−1|t−1 · T
′(j − 1)t|t + R(j − 1)t|t · Q · R
′(j − 1)t|t
y(j)t|t−1 = Hx(j)t|t−1
F(j)t = H · P(j)t|t−1 · H
′
vt(j) = zt − y(j)t|t−1
2. update state and covariance given the guess matrices
Kt(j) = P(j)t|t−1 · H
′ (C.6)
x(j)t|t = xt|t−1 + Kt(j)Ft(j)
−1v(j)t
P(j)t|t = P(j)t|t−1 − K(j)tFt(j)
−1K(j)′t
3. perform a one step backward iteration (a smoother step) to also update the state in t − 1
given t and estimate the shock in t, i.e. for s = t, t − 1
Ls = I − K(j)sFs(j)
−1H (C.7)
r(j)s = H
′Fs(j)
−1vs(j) + L
′
sT
′(j − 1)s|sr(j)s+1
x(j)s|t = xs|s−1 + P(j)s|s−1 · r(j)s
ε(j)s|t = Q · R
′(j − 1) · r(j)s
where the backward one step recursion is initialized by rt+1 = 0.
4. project the piecewise linear model given the initial condition x(j)t−1|t and shock ε(j)t|t for
s ∈ (t, ∞) and obtain the updated matrices T(j)t|t,R(j)t|t, C(j)t|t
(a) if the updated state matrices are different from the guessed ones, update the guess
matrices to T(j)t|t,R(j)t|t, C(j)t|t and restart from 1) with j + 1
(b) otherwise, proceed to t + 1 and until T, by setting updated state matrices
Tt|t = T(j)t|t = T(j − 1)t|t
Rt|t = R(j)t|t = R(j − 1)t|t
Ct|t = C(j)t|t = C(j − 1)t|t,
as well as states and covariances
xt|t = x(j)t|t
Pt|t = P(j)t|t
Note that the updating algorithm applies one backward smoothing step for each period t. Each
step of the algorithm is simple since it applies standard Kalman filter formula, using the guess state
matrices. For the piecewise linear solution method, this filtering and updating algorithm is optimal
in the least-squares sense. Typically one iteration is sufficient for the convergence of the updating
step. In case of failed convergence, we give a penalty to the likelihood and try a new proposal for
the deep parameters.
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Given the prediction error
vt(j) = zt − y(j)t|t−1 (C.8)
we can compute the log-likelihood density of the data at time t:
Lt = log(det(F(j)t)) + v(j)
′
t · F(j)t
−1 · v(j)t + nt log(2π) (C.9)
where j denotes the updated state matrices at the end of the update step and nt denotes the number
of observables available in time t.
C.3 Shock decomposition
This section provides additional details on how we obtain an additive shock decomposition for the
nonlinear model.
To fix ideas, consider a piecewise-linear Kalman smoother, which estimates the sequence of
regimes in the historical time interval. The sequence of regimes triggers a sequence of state-space
matrices:
yt = C(t) + T(t)yt−1 + R(t)et, (C.10)
where yt stacks all endogenous variables in deviation from steady state, et are the smoothed shocks,
and C(t) is a constant which is triggered by the regime. C = 0 in the unconstrained regime.31
The algorithm estimates the additive shock decompositions in two steps. The first step exploits
the piecewise-linear Kalman smoother, that provides the smoothed estimate of the sequence of
regimes together with the historical series of exogenous shocks. Given the sequence of regimes,
the shocks are propagated individually though the sequence of state-space matrices T(t) and R(t).
The array C(t) is treated as an additional exogenous process, labelled “regime effect”.32
A second step extends this procedure to obtain an additive shock decomposition. Note first
that the regime effect results from the interaction of all shocks simultaneously hitting the system
∀τ ≤ t. Hence, the regime effect is a function of exogenous shocks. For each t and variable j, we
compute the absolute value of the contribution of each shock ei,t onto a variable y
R
j :
wj,i,t = |y
R
t (ei,t)|, (C.11)
where wj,i,t is a set of weights which apportion the regime affect all shocks and y
R
j is a variable
determining the regime sequence. In case of the ZLB constraint on the Taylor rule, yR = [πt, ỹt],
i.e. the arguments of the nominal interest rate rule. Both are functions of shocks yRt (ei,t) and can
be used to calculate the weights wj,i,t. The intuition behind this procedure is the following. Any
shock causing a change in the Taylor rule (and the associated monetary policy regime) matters for
the regime effect. For example, a large enough expansionary demand shock shortens the duration
of the ZLB constrained regime and increases inflation and the output gap.
31Note that at the ZLB, the Taylor rule it = ilb violates the steady state condition (ilb < ī).
32The RISE Toolbox (Maih 2015) follows a similar approach.
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